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Abstract. Models of spatial firm competition assume that customers are distributed in space and trans-
portation costs are associated with their purchases of products from a small number of firms that are also
placed at definite locations. It has been long known that the competition equilibrium is not guaranteed
to exist if the most straightforward linear transportation costs are assumed. We show by simulations and
also analytically that if periodic boundary conditions in two dimensions are assumed, the equilibrium ex-
ists for a pair of firms at any distance. When a larger number of firms is considered, we find that their
total equilibrium profit is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of firms. We end with a
numerical investigation of the system’s behavior for a general transportation cost exponent.
PACS. 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management – 89.75.-k Com-
plex systems
1 Introduction
The problem of firm competition in an economy has been
studied extensively in the past, leading to the classical
concepts such as perfect competition, price equilibrium,
and oligopoly [1]. Among the models of competition, two
classical models stand up: the Cournot competition where
the participating companies decide the produced amount
and Bertrand competition where the companies decide the
product price. Depending on circumstances, the former
or the latter may be more appropriate to model a given
situation. The rather extreme assumptions made by the
Bertrand model lead to a so-called Bertrand paradox: in
equilibrium, all participating firms earn zero profits [2,3].
This is because the firms have an incentive to decrease the
price and thus attract all the consumers in the market, and
the spiral of price decrease does not stop until the product
marginal cost equals the product price for each firm, and
thus zero profit is made by all. These assumptions can be
relaxed by considering product differentiation [4] and non-
price competition [5], production capacities [6], consumer
search costs [7], and—the key point of interest on this
paper—transportation costs [8].
In the real world, market activities usually occur at dif-
ferent points in space which makes it important to include
transportation costs in our considerations of economics.
Consumer-side transportation costs have been first intro-
duced in a classical paper on firm competition by Hotelling
where the author considers the case of consumers dis-
tributed uniformly on a line of length l and assumes that
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product price (often referred to as “mill price” in the lit-
erature) is augmented by the transportation cost which
is proportional to the distance between the consumer and
the firm [8]. This simple setting makes it possible to study
the price competition of firms and, assuming that the firms
are free to choose their location, also the question of the
optimal location. As a result, the paper has initiated an
extensive line of research in spatial competition (see [9,10]
for reviews).
However, 50 years after the original article was pub-
lished, an important flaw has been discovered in its anal-
ysis: the price equilibrium does not exist when the two
competing firms are close, unless one switches from linear
to quadratic transportation costs [11]. It has been shown
later that quadratic transportation costs are in fact the
only one in the family of power-law transportation cost
functions for which the price equilibrium exists—all other
powers share the flaw of linear transportation costs when
the firms are located sufficiently close to each other [12,
13]. Furthermore, the original conclusion that for the firms
it is advantageous to be close to each other [8] (so-called
principle of minimum differentiation [14]) changes dramat-
ically under quadratic transportation costs as it becomes
advantageous for the firms to be as much apart as pos-
sible [11,15] (see [16] for a survey on equilibrium exis-
tence and product differentiation). Note that one refers
to product differentiation here because the firm’s position
in physical space can be interpreted as the product’s posi-
tion in the space of product properties; the transportation
cost consequently becomes the additional cost attributed
to a mismatch between the product’s properties and the
consumer’s preferences [17].
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Despite their limited relevance to real economy, studies
of the one-dimensional case (so-called “Hotelling’s beach”)
prevail because of its mathematical tractability [18,19,20].
In some works, a circular market is considered (in the
physics terminology, periodic boundary conditions in one
dimension are assumed) which has profound influence on
the existence of equilibrium and its nature [21,22]. Analy-
ses of the two-dimensional [13] and multi-dimensional [17]
case exist but, motivated by the analytical studies of the
one-dimensional case, assume quadratic transportation costs.
By contrast, we use analytical and simulation techniques
to study the Hotelling model in plane with periodic bound-
ary conditions. We first show that with linear transporta-
tion costs, the Nash equilibrium of two firms exists and
present analytical expressions for the equilibrium price
and profit. The difference between the case with and with-
out periodic boundary conditions is discussed in detail. We
then study a situation where many firms compete and in-
vestigate how the equilibrium’s properties depend on the
number of firms. We consider here also the general case of
transportation costs that grow as a power of distance; lin-
ear and quadratic transportations costs are special cases
of the general case.
In our study, we assume almost exclusively periodic
boundary conditions (PBCs) which are generally favor-
able for numerical simulations as they help to suppress
the finite-size effects. With two competing firms, PBCs
can be interpreted as the influence of “external” firms be-
yond the simulated region’s boundary. When there are
many competing firms, PBCs assure that apart from sta-
tistical fluctuations in firm positions, no firm is in a priv-
ileged location. Without PBCs, firms in the middle of the
studied region are completely surrounded by competing
firms (they effectively experience PBCs) and their loca-
tion is thus considerably less advantageous than that of a
firm with no competitors between the firm and a bound-
ary. Finally, we will show that PBCs are crucial in making
the equilibrium of firm competition stable and analytically
tractable.
2 Model
We assume that the customers are uniformly distributed
in the unit square [0, 1]×[0, 1]. In the discrete version of the
model, which we employ for simulations, the customers are
labeled with a pair of indices. The coordinates of customer
(i, j) are (xi, yj) where xi = (i− 0.5)/N , yj = (j− 0.5)/N
and i, j = 1, . . . , N ; there are thus N2 customers in total.
Assuming that there are m firms in the unit square, we
label their coordinates as (Xk, Yk) where k = 1, . . . ,m.
Since we consider a domain of unit area, the number of
customers N2 and the number of firms m are equivalent
to the customer and firm density, respectively.
The offered product price of firm k is pk. The effective
cost Ek(i, j) that customer (i, j) has to pay for the product
of firm k consists of the product price and the transporta-
tion costs. Denoting the transportation cost over a unit
distance as r and the exponent of the distance dependence
1 2
(A)
non-periodic
1 2
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periodic
Fig. 1. By setting their product prices, the firms divide the
customers among themselves. The main example here (solid
lines and shaded regions) is of firm 1 at (0.2, 0.5) with price
0.8 and firm 2 at (0.5, 0.5) with price 1 (linear transportation
costs with r = 1). For comparison, we show also the results
when the product price of firm 1 is 0.9 (dashed line) and 1.0
(dotted line). Panels A and B show the case without and with
periodic boundary conditions, respectively.
as γ, we write
Ek(i, j) = pk + r
[
∆(xi, Xk)
2 +∆(yj , Yk)
2
]γ/2
. (1)
A multiplying factor of two corresponding to the travel to
the location of firm k and back is assumed to be included
in the multiplier r for simplicity. Note that while γ =
1 results in transportation costs that depend linearly on
the customer-store distance, γ = 2 reproduces the much-
studied case of quadratic transportation costs.
The coordinate difference ∆(·, ·) in Eq. (1) can be con-
sidered simply as the absolute value of the difference be-
tween the two coordinates; this corresponds to the model
variant with non-periodic boundary conditions. The form
of ∆(·, ·) is different under periodic boundary conditions
where it reads
∆(xi, Xk) =
{
|xi −Xk| for |xi −Xk| ≤ 1/2,
1− |xi −Xk| for |xi −Xk| > 1/2. (2)
That is, the customer chooses the shorter of the two pos-
sible paths: either within the unit square or across the
unit square’s boundary. The form of ∆(yj , Yk) is analo-
gous. Under periodic boundary conditions, the shortest
path between (0.9, 0.5) and (0.2, 0.5) has the length of 0.3
as opposed to 0.7 when periodic boundary conditions are
not considered. As illustrated in Figure 1, the choice of
boundary conditions has profound consequences on firm
competition when the number of firms is small.
In the discrete version of the model where N2 individ-
ual customers are present, we assume that each of them
chooses the firm k that minimizes the effective cost. This
mathematically corresponds to minimizing Ek(i, j) given
by Eq. (1) with respect to k. Note that, as typical for
Bertrand-like models, there is no upper bound for the price
that the customers are willing to pay [1]. A monopolist
firm would therefore earn an arbitrarily high profit in this
setting. Denoting the number of customers who choose
firm k as Nk, the profit of firm k is then pkNk (we assume
here for simplicity that the products are produced at zero
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cost; another view at this is that pk are “excess” prices
beyond the product’s production costs). To remove the
profit dependence on N , it is advantageous to consider
firm profit per customer Xk = pkNk/N
2. The discrete
version is convenient for numerical simulations where cus-
tomers minimize their effective prices; once firm positions
and prices are known, it is straightforward to compute Nk
and Xk for all firms. A continuous version of the model,
which formally corresponds to the limit N → ∞ of the
discrete model, is convenient for an analytical treatment.
In the continuous case, we divide the unit square into re-
gions, each of whose includes all points for which a given
firm minimizes the effective cost (we can again assume
either periodic or non-periodic boundary conditions). As-
suming that the region belonging to firm k has surface Sk,
the profit of firm is Xk = pkSk which is a continuous ana-
log of the previous form Xk = pkNk. The convenience of
the continuous version lies in the fact that both pk and Sk
can be changed infinitesimally; we use this in Section 4 to
analytically solve the Nash equilibrium for two competing
firms at an arbitrary distance.
3 Simulations results
To illustrate the emergence of a competition equilibrium
in the case with periodic boundary conditions, we consider
two firms at distance d. The initial product price, which we
set to 0.3 in our simulations, turns out to be unimportant
for the long-term behavior of the system. Simulations pro-
ceed in steps in which the firms alternate in their attempts
to maximize their profit. For example, when firm 1 opti-
mizes its profit, we maximize X1(p1|p2) with respect to
p1 assuming that p2 is given and fixed. In simulations, we
carry out 120 consecutive profit optimizations. To avoid
the influence of the initial conditions, the first 80 price and
profit values are excluded from the evaluation of results.
In simulations of a discrete system with N2 customers,
the profit of a firm is a discontinuous function of price: it
grows linearly almost everywhere except for a finite set
of points where one (or more) customers change from one
firm to another (see Figure 2A for an illustration). Because
of this discontinuous behavior, we do not use any of the
standard maximization methods but simply evaluate the
profit profit for 10,000 evenly-spaced price values in the
range [0, 1] to find the optimal response of firm 1 to the
price set by firm 2.1 We find that for any finite value of
N and general initial conditions, prices and profits exhibit
variations that do not vanish with simulation rounds. To
show that the model actually leads to an equilibrium in
the limit N → ∞, Figure 2B shows that the variance of
firm profit is proportional to 1/N2 and thus vanishes in
the thermodynamic limit.
1 To prevent the emergence of periodic profit patterns, we
used 100,000 evaluation points for N = 640 (the last evaluation
point in Figure 2B) and d = 0.5.
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Fig. 2. Numerical investigation of the firm competition. (A)
Profit of firm 1 per customer as a function of product price
p1 for various product prices p2 of the competing firm at dis-
tance d = 0.5. When N is larger than N = 10 assumed here,
the profit profile becomes correspondingly smoother, yet it re-
mains discontinuous. (B) The average variance of firm profit
in consecutive optimization steps as a function of the system
size. The indicative dashed line has slope −1.
4 Analytical results
To analytically study the competition equilibrium for two
firms, we assume that the positions of firms 1 and 2 are
(0, 0.5) and (d, 0.5), respectively, where d ∈ (0, 0.5] (due
to periodic boundary conditions, d ∈ (0.5, 1) is equivalent
with a corresponding smaller value d′ = 1− d). While the
exact choice of firm position is important in the discrete
case, in the continuous case with periodic boundary con-
ditions, it is only the mutual distance of firms, d, what
matters.
By choosing their prices p1 and p2, the firms divide
the plane into two parts: in their effort to minimize the
effective costs, customers in region 1 choose firm 1 over
firm 2 and vice versa (see Figure 1A for an illustration).
Boundaries of the regions are characterized by the effec-
tive costs of the two firms being equal along them. Points
(xl, yl) on the left boundary thus satisfy the condition
r
√
x2l + (yl − 0.5)2 + p1 =
= r
√
(xl − d)2 + (yl − 0.5)2 + p2
(3)
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and points (xr, yr) on the right boundary satisfy
r
√
(xr − 1)2 + (yr − 0.5)2 + p1 =
= r
√
(xr − d)2 + (yr − 0.5)2 + p2.
(4)
Note that the right boundary is due to periodic boundary
conditions; without them, only the left boundary exists.
Since the two firms are equivalent, the equilibrium
price p∗ must be the same for both of them. The area
of both region 1 and 2 is then equal to 1/2. The two re-
gions are then divided by parallel vertical boundaries: one
at xl = d/2 and the other at xr = (1+d)/2 (this is true for
any identical product prices p1 = p2, not only for the Nash
equilibrium of firm competition). To find the equilibrium
price, we consider a small perturbation of the equilibrium
by, say, firm 2 changing its price to p∗ + ∆p. The new
profit of firm 2 is then
X ′2(p
∗ +∆p, p∗) = (p∗ +∆p)S2(p∗ +∆p, p∗) =
= (p∗ +∆p)
∫ 1
0
[
xr(y)− xl(y)
]
dy
(5)
where xr(y) and xl(y) are the corresponding left and right
boundary of region 2 when product prices are p∗ and p∗+
∆p, respectively.
If p∗ is indeed the equilibrium price, the new profit of
firm 2 must be the same as in equilibrium (up to O(∆p2)).
By doing the algebra, we eventually find the profit of each
firm in the Nash equilibrium in the form
X∗(d, r) =
(1− d)dr
Ω(d)
(6)
where
Ω(d) = d
√
(1− d)2 + 1 + (1− d)
√
d2 + 1+
+ 3d(1− d)2 ln (1− d) + 3d2(1− d) ln d−
− d(1− d)2 ln
(
(1− d)2
[√
(1− d)2 + 1− 1
])
−
− d2(1− d) ln
(
d2
[√
d2 + 1− 1
])
.
(7)
In the derivation, we benefit from the fact that a small
change of the price by one of the firms changes the orig-
inal straight boundaries only infinitesimally. One can im-
mediately note that the resulting Nash profit is directly
proportional to the transportation cost rate r and that
it shows the expected symmetry X∗(d, r) = X∗(1 − d, r)
which is a direct consequence of assuming the periodic
boundary conditions. Since the area of region 2 in equi-
librium is 1/2, the equilibrium price follows immediately
from X∗(d, r) = p∗(d, r) × 12 . As shown in Figure 3, the
obtained analytical formula is in a good agreement with
results of numerical simulations (although, convergence to
the analytical result is rather slow).
4.1 Equilibrium existence
Similarly as shown in [11] for the one-dimensional case,
the competition equilibrium does not exist when the pe-
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Fig. 3. (A) The average equilibrium profit per customer versus
the distance between the two firms: a comparison between the
analytical solution and numerical results obtained on systems
with different size. (B) When periodic boundary conditions are
not assumed, the profit of firm 1 can have multiple maxima
(here for p2 = 0.71) which leads to abrupt changes of price
and prevent the equilibrium from emerging (firms 1 and 2 are
here located at [0, 0.5] and [0.5, 0.5], respectively).
riodic boundary conditions are not assumed. Instead, pe-
riodic patterns emerge where prices chosen by the firms
slowly grow for a number of turns until it becomes prof-
itable for the worse-located firm (i.e., the one closer to
the unit square boundary) to substantially lower its price
and thus attract all the customers. This can be seen in
Figure 3B where the profit-maximizing price p1 is around
0.50 when p2 = 0.65 and changes discontinuously to 0.20
when p2 ≈ 0.71. Note that for p2 = 0.71 (and above),
the maximum lies on the line X(p1) = p1 which means
that it is indeed achieved by attracting all the customers
at the expense of the other firm. It follows from Eq. (3)
that the highest price p1 that still attracts all the cus-
tomers is p′1 = p2 − rd where d is the distance between
the firms. If firm 1 cannot achieve higher profit by set-
ting price p1 > p
′
1, where the lost of customers would be
compensated by the increased price, p′1 emerges as a local
maximum. As shown in Figure 3B, this occurs only when
p2 is sufficiently high; only then has firm 1 the incentive to
increase its profit by dramatically reducing its price and
thus attracting all the customers.
To understand the abrupt changes of product price
quantitatively, assume that two firms located at [0, 0.5]
and [d, 0.5] have reached the state (p1, p2) where both p1
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and p2 are local maxima of the corresponding firm’s profit.
The area claimed by the worse-positioned firm 1 is S1. The
current state (p1, p2) is assumed to be locally optimal but
it is stable only if firm 1 does not have the incentive to
undercut firm 2 by lowering its price to attract all the
customers. The profit achieved by doing so would be p′1×1
as opposed to the current firm’s profit p1 × S1. It thus
follows that the current state is stable only if
p′1 < p1S1. (8)
This condition is only fulfilled when the two firms are suf-
ficiently apart. By taking, for example, d = 0.2, one can
find numerically that p1 ≈ 0.12, p2 ≈ 0.24, and S1 ≈ 0.30
(we assume r = 1 here). Therefore p′1 = 0.04 and the
inequality above is violated because p1S1 ≈ 0.036. The
local maximum is thus not stable and an endless series of
price adjustments by the two firms ensues instead of an
equilibrium.
We return now to the case with periodic boundary
conditions which is simpler to analyze because any local
maximum must be necessarily symmetric. Starting in a
local maximum (p∗, p∗), it is not favorable for a firm to
set price p′ = p∗− rd and thus attract all the customers if
thus-achieved profit is smaller than the current one. The
current area claimed by both firms is 1/2. Equation (8)
thus takes the form p∗−rd < p∗/2 which implies p∗ < 2rd.
One can easily verify that the equilibrium price p∗ = 2X∗
that follows from Eq. (6) satisfies the obtained stability
inequality over the whole range d ∈ [0, 0.5] and the local
maximum (p∗, p∗) is therefore always stable.
To conclude, we write the stability condition again in
the form
p1 >
p1 + (p2 − p1)− rd
S1
. (9)
In the periodic case, p2 = p1 and S1 is increased by the
fact that firm 1 can also attract customers from the region
“behind” firm 2. In the non-periodic case, p2 > p1 (the
better-positioned firm can afford asking a higher price)
and S1 is smaller than in the periodic case. The corre-
sponding stability inequality is therefore stronger and as
the firms get closer to each other, the inequality is eventu-
ally violated and stability lost. These findings are in par-
allel with the study of the one-dimensional case presented
in [22] where the introduction of periodic boundary condi-
tions also restores the existence of an equilibrium in pure
strategies.
5 Competition of multiple firms
As we mentioned in Introduction, the main reason for as-
suming periodic boundary conditions is the fact that in
many situations, there are many firms competing in the
market. To further investigate this case, we now study how
the equilibrium profit changes with the number of firms in
the unit square. It is clear that in the general case with m
firms, their precise mutual positions determine the equi-
librium profit of each of them. The situation is therefore
much more complex than in the case of two firms where
their distance d is the only variable. To refrain from un-
necessary details, we assume that the firms are distributed
in the plane at random with uniform probabilistic density.
We aim to characterize the average equilibrium profit in
such a situation with emphasis on the case of m 1.
Even when the firms are placed at random, the equi-
librium price of a particular firm is decided by the dis-
tances of several firms that surround it. In particular, the
firms that lie in the adjacent regions of the Voronoi tes-
sellation of the plane are the ones with which the studied
firm has direct contact and competes for customers. The
equilibrium prices of those firms are further decided by
their neighboring competing firms, and so forth, and it is
thus easy to see that the situation is not analytically ap-
proachable without making a further simplifying assump-
tion. Since the strongest competition is with the closest
neighboring firm (as shown in Figure 3, equilibrium profit
increases with distance between the firms), our simplify-
ing assumption is that the equilibrium profit is decided
solely by the distance of the closest firm. This effectively
breaks the afore-described infinite chain of firm interac-
tions and returns us to the two-firm case that we have
studied above.
To compute the average distance of the closest firm,
we use extreme statistics and compute the probability that
the closest firm is at distance D ∈ [R,R+∆R) (∆R→ 0).
This probability is composed of three factors: the proba-
bility that one firm is at distance [R,R+∆R], the proba-
bility that the remaining m − 2 firms are not closer than
R + ∆R, and m − 1 which corresponds to the fact that
any of the remaining m − 1 firms can be the closest one.
Taken together, we have
P (R ≤ D < R+∆R) = 2piR∆R% (1− piR2%)m−2(m− 1)
(10)
which further simplifies if we plug in the uniform probabil-
ity density % = 1. Note that we neglect here the square ge-
ometry of the unit square and the periodic boundary con-
ditions; we can do that because the closest firm is typically
close enough to make these effects unimportant (especially
when m is large). Integration of P (R ≤ D < R+∆R) over
R from 0 to 1/
√
pi (the value at which the probability den-
sity decreases to zero) shows that this probability density
is properly normalized. We finally compute the average
distance of the closest firm as
D =
∫ 1/√pi
0
RP (R) dR =
m− 1
2
Γ (m− 1)
Γ (m+ 1/2)
=
=
1 +O(1/m)
2m1/2
(11)
where we used the asymptotic form Γ (x + n)/Γ (x) =
xn[1 + O(1/x)] for x → ∞. This result agrees well with
numerical simulations (figure not shown). Note that the
scaling of D with m is easy to obtain by arguing that D
creates a region with area piD
2
around each firm and the
total number of those areas should roughly match the total
area of the unit square. We can thus write mpiD
2 ≈ 1 and
therefore D ∝ 1/√m which scales with m as we derived
above.
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Eq. (6) can now be multiplied with two to yield the
total profit of firms in the two-firm situation. By substi-
tuting the obtained D for d in this result and further di-
viding with m, we obtain the profit per firm in the general
situation with m firms. Since the resulting form of the firm
profit is very convoluted, we work out the leading contri-
bution in the limit m→∞ which has the form
X(m) =
r
m3/2
+O(1/m2). (12)
Looking back at the total profit of the competing firms,
we get Xtotal(m) = mX(m) = r/
√
m which tells us that
the total profit of all involved firms decays as the number
of firms grows.
To verify the obtained analytical result, we run nu-
merical simulations with a gradually increasing number
of competing firms. Figure 4A shows how the average
profit per firm and customer decreases with the number
of firms m. We use weighted least-squares to fit the sim-
ulation results obtained for m ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64} (smaller
values of m are ignored because the power-law scaling of
the profit per firm is expected to hold only for large m)
with X(r,m) = Ar/mB . The resulting parameter values
are A = 0.32 ± 0.02 and B = 1.50 ± 0.07; the value of
B is in an excellent agreement with the analytical result
1.50 contained in Eq. (12). By contrast, the value of A
is substantially smaller than the analytical value of 1. In
summary, Eq. (12) produces a correct scaling of the equi-
librium profit per firm with the number of firms, yet it
overestimates the profit’s absolute value by a factor of
three. The reason for this discrepancy is simple. In deriv-
ing the analytical result, we assumed that each firm com-
petes only with its closest neighbor. However, each firm is
in fact surrounded by a few firms which are all similarly
close. The true level of competition is therefore more fierce
than we assumed and it is natural to expect that Eq. (12)
overestimates the average profit of competing firms.
6 Non-linear transportation costs
The last question to address is that of a general trans-
portation cost dependence in the form rdγ where r is a
proportionality term, d is the distance between the cus-
tomer and the firm and γ > 0 is a distance exponent. By
repeating the same progression of steps as described above
for γ = 1, we obtain estimates of the exponent B in the
power-law relation between the equilibrium profit per firm
and the number of competing firms. The obtained results
are shown in Figure 4B. In the frequently-studied case of
quadratic transportation costs, the measured profit scal-
ing exponent is B = 1.98 ± 0.06 (the total profit of all
firms thus decays as 1/m). Overall, the numerical results
suggest that B = 1 + γ/2 holds in the range γ ∈ (0, 2].
However, as can be seen in Figure 4B, the initial linear
growth of B with γ becomes sub-linear for γ & 2. One can
hypothesize that the change of the dependence of B on γ
at γ = 2 is due to the special standing of quadratic trans-
portation costs with respect to the equilibrium existence
[12,13]. To understand why B should not grow with γ
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Fig. 4. (A) The dependence of the equilibrium profit per firm
and customer on the number of firms for γ = 1. Numerical
results for m ≥ 8 (error bars mark the standard deviation
values) are used to fit the dependence Ar/mB ; the result is
shown with a dashed line. (B) The dependence of the estimated
profit exponent on the exponent γ of transportation costs. The
indicative solid line is B = 1 + γ/2. All results for N = 80.
without bounds, we formulate the following approximate
reasoning. We consider the case of large γ and introduce
the total profit of all firms T (m) = mX(m). When a new
firm l is introduced in the system, this has only local con-
sequences because quickly-growing transportation costs—
only the firms in direct vicinity are affected by the new
competitor. The new total profit T (m + 1) can be thus
written as
T (m+ 1) ≈ T (m) +
∑
k∼l
∆Xk +Xl
where ∆Xk is the induced change of profit of all firms in
the vicinity of l and Xl is the profit of the newly added
firm. How fast can T (m) decrease with m? To see the
fastest possible decrease, we assume that Xl is negligi-
ble and ∆Xk = −Xk(m) (the profit of neighboring firms
evaporates). Assuming that there are Θ neighboring firms
in total, we now have T (m+ 1) ≈ T (m)−ΘX(m). Since
X(m) = T (m)/m, we can write T (m + 1) = T (m) −
ΘT (m)/m which can be converted to the differential equa-
tion
T (m+ 1)− T (m) ≈ dT/dm = −ΘT (m)/m
whose solution is T (m) = C/mΘ. Since Θ, the number
of neighbors of the newly introduced firm l, is a small
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number, we see that the profit exponent B indeed cannot
be arbitrarily large. This explains the saturation of the
growth of B with γ that is depicted in Figure 4B. In any
case, values of the transportation cost exponent beyond
γ = 2 are little relevant as they are difficult to justify in
a realistic setting.
7 Discussion
We studied the problem of spatial firm competition with
linear transportation costs which, after it initially spurred
considerable interest [8], has been much neglected because
it does not feature an equilibrium in a case with two firms
that are located sufficiently close to each other [11]. We
show here that the problem of equilibrium non-existence
does not occur when periodic boundary conditions are
considered; the equilibrium then emerges for firms at any
distance regardless of the initial conditions. We provide
analytical results for the case with two competing firms
which compare favorably with extensive numerical sim-
ulations of the system. The case of multiple competing
firms is considered as well. The main result in this respect
is that the total equilibrium profit of all firms decreases as
1/
√
m where m is the number of competing firms. This,
as typical for models of spatial firm competition, is in a
stark contrast with the basic Bertrand model where the
firm profit is zero for any m ≥ 2. Numerical study of gen-
eral transportation costs that grow as a power of distance
shows that the equilibrium profit per firm still has the
form 1/mB with the exponent B generally growing with
the exponent of the transportation costs.
More generally, our work shows that there is a good
reason to study spatial firm competition with linear trans-
portation costs which are arguably more natural and com-
mon than quadratic ones. Besides analytically studying
the general case of power-law transportation costs, the
issue of non-homogeneous customer density also requires
attention. Another possibility is to apply the concept of
spatial competition on a complex network [23]. While we
have assumed here that the firm locations are fixed, the
problem of optimal firm location has attracted consider-
able interest [24] and is relevant also here. In addition to
freeing the positions of all firms, one can also consider
the competition of two firms where each firm can open
and locate an arbitrary number of affiliated stores. The
equilibrium then emerges when the gain from attracting
more customers does not match fixed running costs of new
stores.
This work was supported by the EU FET-Open Grant No.
611272 (project Growthcom).
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